Online Altruism Lab

Results and Discussion

The results are similar to those of the Matrix Games simulation, although the population here is structured across neighborhoods and not in groups.

Here, too, it can be seen that altruistic traits can prevail in both the Prisoner's Dilemma (T > R > P > S) and the Game of Chicken (T > R > S > P) when P < threshold ≤ R. In other words: The threshold must be higher than the payoff for D when it interacts with another D (→ P or punishment), and less than or equal to the payoff for a C against another C (→ R or reward).

In the deer hunting game (R > T ≥ P > S), we achieve a similar result to that of the Matrix Games. So, altruism prevails here at T or P < threshold < R as well. This means that the threshold must be greater than the minimum payoff of D and less than or equal to the payoff for C when competing against another C.

Figure 1: Threshold ranges for the outcomes of both the Matrix Games simulation and the Cellular Automaton. S, P, R and T are the specified payoff options, and the color-coded areas indicate how the populations develop in the given games. Stable altruistic populations (blue ranges) are possible with all the three games at threshold values between P and R. In Game of Chicken, a stable population of egoists is not possible, but it is possible with the other two strategies (yellow range).

You can find more details about this in the results page of the Matrix Games.

References and further reading

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